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DEPOLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN† 
THOMAS J. MILES†† 
ABSTRACT 
  A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that judicial 
review of agency action is highly politicized in the sense that 
Republican appointees are significantly more likely to invalidate 
liberal agency decisions than conservative ones, while Democratic 
appointees are significantly more likely to invalidate conservative 
agency decisions than liberal ones. These results hold for both (a) 
judicial review of agency interpretations of law and (b) judicial review 
of agency decisions for “arbitrariness” on questions of policy and 
fact. On the federal courts of appeals, the most highly politicized 
voting patterns are found on unified panels, that is, on panels 
consisting solely of either Democratic or Republican appointees. On 
the Supreme Court, politicized administrative law is also 
unmistakable, as the more conservative Justices show a distinctive 
willingness to vote to invalidate liberal agency decisions, and the more 
liberal Justices show a distinctive willingness to vote to invalidate 
conservative agency decisions. Indeed, it is possible to “rank” Justices 
in terms of the extent to which their voting patterns are politicized. 
The empirical results raise an obvious question: what might be done 
to depoliticize administrative law? Three sets of imaginable solutions 
have promise: (1) self-correction without formal doctrinal change, 
produced by a form of “debiasing” that might follow from a clearer 
judicial understanding of the current situation; (2) doctrinal 
innovations, as, for example, through rethinking existing deference 
principles and giving agencies more room to maneuver; and (3) 
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institutional change, through novel voting rules and requirements of 
mixed panels. Each of these solutions runs into significant problems, 
though the evidence suggests that mixed panels would greatly reduce 
politicized voting. An investigation of these solutions has implications 
for other domains in which judges are divided along political lines, 
and indeed in which nonjudicial officials, including members of 
regulatory commissions, show some kind of politicized division or 
bias. In multiple areas, politicized voting might be reduced through 
disclosure of existing patterns, through doctrinal changes, or through 
institutional change. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a parallel world, very much like our own. In this world, 
administrative law is radically politicized. If the question is the 
legality of an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term, the court’s 
answer can be predicted by asking about the political affiliation of the 
president who appointed the judges on the panel. If the question is 
whether an agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious, the court’s 
answer can be predicted in the same way. In such a world, the crudest 
versions of legal realism would be vindicated: whatever the formal 
doctrine, the outcome of disputes in administrative law would be a 
product of the judges’ political predilections. Administrative law 
would be purely a matter of judicial politics. 
Fortunately, that world is not our own. Disputes about the 
legality of agency action cannot be predicted in so simple a fashion.1 
Unfortunately, however, that world has something in common with 
our own.2 At least in the last three administrations—under Presidents 
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush—
administrative law has been highly politicized in the sense that on the 
courts of appeals, the evidence reveals sharp divisions between 
Republican and Democratic appointees in a way that fits 
 
 1. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006) [hereinafter Miles & 
Sunstein, Do Judges]; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Real World]. 
 2. For a seminal study, see generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). For a valuable study of the Supreme 
Court, see generally William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
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uncomfortably well with ideological stereotypes.3 Under President 
George W. Bush, politicized voting was quite visible: a panel of 
Democratic appointees was especially likely to strike down 
conservative decisions from the Bush administration, and a panel 
consisting solely of Republican appointees was especially likely to 
uphold such decisions.4 
On the Supreme Court, the situation has been similar not only 
under the Bush administration, but for the last decade and more.5 
Some members of the Court—above all, Justices Clarence Thomas 
and John Paul Stevens—show highly ideological voting patterns in 
the sense that their willingness to vote to validate an agency’s 
interpretation of law can be predicted, much of the time, by asking 
whether the interpretation is conservative or liberal.6 In the last eight 
years, politicization of the administrative state and the judiciary has 
been a significant source of public concern, and recent judicial 
behavior, in administrative law, shows a high degree of politicized 
voting. 
To say the least, this seems to be a disturbing and somewhat 
embarrassing state of affairs. Whatever one’s view of the foundational 
questions in administrative law, no one should approve of a situation 
in which judicial voting patterns are highly politicized.7 On the 
contrary, it is reasonable to read existing doctrines as an explicit 
 
 3. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1147; Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 
851; Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 767. These essays, focused on administrative 
law, should be seen as part of a large and growing area of empirical study. For a discussion and 
of this area and citations to relevant pieces, see generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008). 
 4. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 836. 
 5. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2, at 1153–57. 
 6. See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 851; see also Eskridge & Baer, supra 
note 2, at 1156–57 (detailing a somewhat different set of numbers spanning over a longer period 
of time). 
 7. If agency decisions have an ideological skew, of course, it might be desirable to have a 
high level of invalidations; and if the agency’s skew leads to a high level of unlawful “liberal” 
decisions, then a percentage of invalidation of such decisions would be nothing to deplore. The 
problem is that even if agency decisions are skewed in one or another direction, a large and 
predictable split between Republican and Democratic appointees would be hard to defend, and 
would justify a high level of concern. 
Of course we are aware that one person’s skew is another person’s neutral principle; if, 
for example, the Environmental Protection Agency takes a proenvironmental turn, or the 
National Labor Relations Board becomes more sensitive to the interests of employers, there 
would be no “skew” from the right point of view. We do not mean to say anything controversial 
on this count; we use the term “skew” as a simple placeholder for agency departures from the 
correct approach to the relevant area of the law. 
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effort to prevent such patterns from emerging. Most prominently, 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.8 
establishes that courts must uphold agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory provisions so long as those interpretations are 
reasonable.9 Chevron is naturally read to say that resolution of 
statutory ambiguities calls for a policy judgment,10 with the suggestion 
that such judgments should be made by administrators, not judges.11 It 
is disconcerting, to say the least, to find that when judges review 
agency interpretations of law, judicial policy judgments continue to be 
playing a significant role. 
Or consider Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,12 which specifies how judges are to 
evaluate agency decisions challenged as arbitrary or capricious under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.13 State Farm asks judges to 
invalidate agency failure to investigate reasonable alternatives or to 
provide an adequate justification for a particular course of action.14 It 
should go without saying that the State Farm framework is designed 
to discipline agency decisions, not to give free reign to judicial policy 
preferences. Agency decisions are supposed to be invalidated because 
they are not based on an adequate justification, not because judges 
disagree with them on the merits. In these circumstances, it is 
disturbing to find that whether a court of appeals is likely to find an 
agency decision to be “arbitrary” depends, in significant part, on 
whether the panel consists of Republican or Democratic appointees.15 
The official doctrine opposes politicized judging; the practice plainly 
reveals what the doctrine explicitly opposes. 
As we shall see, objections to the apparently politicized voting 
turn out to raise many questions, and it would be possible to wonder 
whether the current situation is as troublesome as it initially appears. 
But politicized voting patterns create an evident problem for the rule 
of law, if only because similarly situated people, including some of the 
nation’s most important institutions, are not being treated similarly. 
 
 8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 9. Id. at 843–44. 
 10. See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles 
of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2005). 
 11. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864. 
 12. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 13. Id. at 43; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 14. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 37–38. 
 15. See Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 812. 
SUNSTEIN_IN_FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:55:48 AM 
2009] DEPOLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2197 
After all, judges are randomly assigned to three-judge panels.16 If all-
Republican panels are likely to strike down liberal regulations from 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and if all-Democratic panels 
are likely to uphold such regulations, the random assignment of 
judges is playing a significant role. And if Supreme Court review is 
unusual, it is troubling to find that the fate of an important domain of 
environmental law will turn on the composition of the appellate 
panel. 
The current evidence also offers a warning for the future. 
Suppose that the federal judiciary consists in large part of appointees 
of George W. Bush, and that in its initial years, an Obama 
administration is issuing a large number of regulations that reflect the 
political commitments of that very president. If politicized voting 
occurs on the federal judiciary, those commitments will run into 
serious trouble before Republican appointees—and there will be 
many such appointees. At first glance, a set of invalidations would 
seem disturbing from the standpoint of democratic self-governance, 
whatever one’s views about George W. Bush and Barack Obama. 
We have three purposes in this Article. The first is to set out in 
one place some of the most revealing evidence on politicized 
administrative law, with the hope that a brief overview of key findings 
will help to show what is wrong with the existing state of affairs. The 
second is to investigate a series of interpretive questions, which raises 
issues about how to construe the evidence, and about how seriously 
the current problem should be taken. The third is to explore several 
sets of potential remedies. One solution involves judicial self-
correction without doctrinal change; another requires doctrinal 
innovations, for example through heightened deference requirements; 
another solution requires institutional change, for example through 
requiring mixed panels in certain cases; yet another calls for changes 
in the confirmation process. 
One of the largest lessons is that while the problem of politicized 
administrative law is unmistakable, there are serious difficulties with 
each of the imaginable solutions. For example, a general increase in 
 
 16. See 28 U.S.C § 46 (2006) (providing for panels consisting of three judges without 
specifying a method of assignment); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal 
for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216–17 (1999) (explaining that random 
assignment has been widely adopted in the federal appellate system, by rule or practice, as it is 
thought to limit intracircuit judge shopping and ensure even caseload distribution among 
judges). 
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judicial deference to agency judgments would help to reduce 
politicized invalidations, but it would also remove some of the 
beneficial features of the current situation, in which a strong judicial 
hand disciplines arbitrariness at the agency level.17 Increased 
deference would increase politicized validations, which may well be a 
serious problem. The data suggest that mixed panels would be the 
most effective corrective,18 but an approach of that kind would 
present serious administrative challenges and also have potentially 
undesirable side effects. Fortunately, some of the potential solutions 
would provide significant help without compromising important 
values. 
A clarification before we proceed: many people are concerned 
about the politicization of administrative law in a quite different sense 
from our understanding here. In their view, a serious problem lies in 
the role of “politics,” understood as interest-group power, over the 
administrative state, especially in domains in which technical 
expertise should prevail.19 On this view, the problem of 
“politicization” consists in insufficient regard for specialized 
knowledge. This is a legitimate and important concern, but it is an 
independent topic. Even if the judgments of administrative agencies 
sometimes reflect an excessive role for politics, in a pejorative sense, 
it remains important to ensure that judicial review of agency action 
does not radically differ depending on whether Republican 
appointees or Democratic appointees are on the panel.20 Our goal 
here is to see how that task might be accomplished. 
While our focus throughout is on administrative law, we hope 
that our elaboration of the problem, of the interpretive issues, and of 
the potential solutions will bear on many areas in which judicial 
voting is highly politicized21 or in which public officials or others are 
divided along some controversial dimension or show some kind of 
 
 17. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—Courts in Administrative Law, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 823 (2008). 
 18. See infra notes 35–36, 46 and accompanying text. 
 19. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW 
SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 2–7 (2008). 
 20. Recall the theoretical possibility that if agencies show a predictable skew (in the sense 
that they are biased in some objectionable way), then some sort of skew, on the part of courts, 
might be necessary to ensure neutrality. The problem is that it cannot be the case that both 
Republican and Democratic appointees are supplying a corrective to any skew—they disagree, 
and hence cannot both be right! 
 21. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 11–38 
(2007); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 87–106 (2006). 
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bias. In any domain, self-corrective, doctrinal innovation, or 
institutional change might provide significant help. In some domains, 
one or another of these solutions might have more promise than in 
the context of administrative law. 
I.  POLITICIZED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EVIDENCE 
A. Method 
For a number of years, we have been studying judicial judgments 
in the domain of administrative law, in an effort to see whether those 
judgments reflect policy choices on the part of federal judges.22 For 
present purposes, our method can be simply described. 
Within the courts of appeals, our focus has been on judicial 
review of decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).23 This approach 
has the advantage of investigating one important executive agency 
(the EPA) and one important independent agency (the NLRB); this 
approach also presents certain advantages in terms of ease of coding. 
There are of course real difficulties in deciding how to “code” agency 
decisions in political terms. It is hard to undertake such coding in the 
abstract; it is even harder to do so when the real question is not 
whether the agency has proceeded in a “liberal” fashion, but how the 
particular controversy, before a court, should be evaluated in political 
terms. Let us begin by describing our choice and then explaining it. 
In brief, we attempted to categorize agency decisions as “liberal” 
or “conservative” by asking whether the challenge was made by a 
company or instead by a public interest group or a labor union.24 If, 
for example, the Sierra Club objected to an EPA decision, the 
 
 22. See generally Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1 (outlining the studies and 
reporting the results); Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1 (same). 
 23. In the case of agency interpretations of law, we examined all cases citing Chevron 
between 1990 and 2004 (253 in total); in the case of arbitrariness review, we examined all 
arbitrariness and substantial evidence cases between 1996 and 2006 (653 in total). 
 24. We also studied whether the agency’s decision was issued in a Republican or 
Democratic administration. In some domains, we found that Republican appointees are more 
likely to vote to uphold decisions of a Republican administration than those of a Democratic 
administration, and that Democratic appointees show a similar kind of favoritism. In Chevron 
cases, for example, Democratic appointees show a 70 percent validation rate under Democratic 
administrations and 61 percent validation rate under Republican administrations, while 
Republican appointees show a 59 percent validation rate under Democratic administrations and 
a 68 percent validation rate under Republican administration. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, 
supra note 1, at 850. In general, however, the liberal-conservative coding is a more accurate way 
of exploring political voting on the courts of appeals, and so that division is our emphasis here. 
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decision was coded as conservative; if General Motors made the 
objection, the decision was coded as liberal. This method has several 
important advantages. It greatly simplifies the coding exercise, avoids 
controversial judgments that might divide reviewers, and thus 
improves administrability and replicability. It can also be defended in 
principle. What matters is not whether the agency’s decision is liberal 
or conservative in the abstract, but the political valence of the 
particular challenge before the court. If, for example, the EPA has 
issued a ruling that some people consider “liberal,” but that is 
challenged by a public interest group that is attempting to increase 
regulation, the ruling is relevantly conservative, in the sense that 
judges are being asked to hold that it is unlawfully weak. 
Admittedly, however, our proxy is crude. For that reason, we 
read all of the cases ourselves. When our method produced what 
seemed to be an incorrect or contestable result, we adjusted the 
coding accordingly. Suppose, for example, that a public interest group 
challenged the agency’s decision, but that the group was conservative, 
and sought to block regulatory action. If so, we reversed the 
categorization; such reversals occurred in a relatively small number of 
cases (under a dozen). If coding proved difficult, because of the range 
of issues and the number of parties, the case was dropped on the 
ground that no coding was reliable; we dropped only a few cases 
(about ten). 
For purposes of evaluating our data, it is important to know the 
distribution of liberal and conservative decisions. In the domains that 
we studied, EPA decisions were evenly split between conservative 
and liberal rulings;25 recall that this means that public interest groups 
challenged EPA decisions at about the same rate that companies did. 
NLRB decisions, by contrast, were disproportionately liberal—67 
percent in Chevron cases, and 94 percent in arbitrariness cases.26 The 
overwhelming majority of challenges to NLRB decisions, in the 
courts of appeals, are brought by employers rather than unions.27 
We also examined whether judicial votes were issued by 
Republican or Democratic appointees to the federal bench, with the 
hypothesis that the division should operate as a proxy for political 
predilections and with the further thought that the effect of the 
political affiliation of the appointing president is of considerable 
 
 25. Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 777. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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independent interest. With this method, we can investigate “liberal 
voting rates” for Democratic and Republican appointees in different 
domains. We can also compare the validation rate of both sets of 
appointees for conservative agency decisions and for liberal agency 
decisions. In addition to studying the effects of party, we can study 
the effects of panels by asking whether the votes of Democratic or 
Republican appointees are affected by the political affiliation of the 
president who appointed the two other judges on the panel. Do 
Democratic appointees show especially liberal voting patterns when 
they sit only with other Democratic appointees? How do the voting 
patterns of Republican appointees differ depending on whether they 
are sitting with no, one, or two Democratic appointees? 
The baseline case, for purposes of studying neutrality and 
partisanship, would show no significant disparities between 
Republican and Democratic appointees. If no such disparities were 
shown, existing administrative law doctrines would be “working” in 
the sense that they would be serving to filter out any effect from the 
most obvious and salient difference among appointees to the federal 
bench. And indeed, there are important areas of federal law in which 
partisan differences are not observed.28 
For the Supreme Court, we took a similar approach. Here, 
however, we examined all decisions that cited Chevron; we did not 
restrict ourselves to the EPA or the NLRB. And instead of 
distinguishing between Republican and Democratic appointees, we 
assessed voting patterns for each of the individual Justices and (to 
obtain greater statistical power) for “blocks” of Justices 
corresponding to conventional judgments about ideological divisions. 
With this approach, we are able to see if political predilections affect 
the Justices’ voting in administrative law cases. Because only a small 
number of “arbitrariness” cases reach the Supreme Court, making 
statistical tests impossible, we did not investigate those cases. 
B. Courts of Appeals: Chevron Cases 
Within the courts of appeals, politicized voting is unmistakable in 
Chevron cases. Consider three different ways to demonstrate this 
point: 
 
 28. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 48–54 (finding no significant effects of political 
party in criminal appeals, federalism, takings, punitive damages, and standing). 
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1. When the agency’s decision is liberal, the Democratic 
validation rate is 74 percent; when the agency’s decision is 
conservative, the Democratic validation rate falls to 51 
percent. The pattern is the opposite for Republican 
appointees—very close to the mirror image. When the 
agency’s decision is liberal, the Republican validation rate is 
59.5 percent. When the agency’s decision is conservative, the 
Republican validation rate jumps to 70 percent.29 
2. When the agency’s decision is liberal, Democratic appointees 
are 14 percent more likely to vote to validate it than are 
Republican appointees. When the agency’s decision is 
conservative, Democratic appointees are 19 percent less likely 
to validate it than are Republican appointees.30 
3. The overall liberal voting rate is 67 percent for Democratic 
appointees; for Republican appointees, it is 50 percent.31 
To be sure, differences of these magnitudes are inconsistent with 
the proposition that in administrative law cases judicial voting is 
thoroughly politicized. It remains true that Republican appointees 
vote to uphold liberal interpretations well over 50 percent of the time, 
and that Democratic appointees are more likely than not to uphold 
conservative interpretations. Nonetheless, the disparities are 
significant. What produces them? 
Intriguingly, they are driven in large part by the radically 
different behavior of both sets of appointees on unified panels —that 
is, panels consisting solely of Democratic appointees (DDD panels) 
or solely of Republican appointees (RRR panel). When Democratic 
appointees are on DDD panels, the validation rate for liberal agency 
decisions is 86 percent; when Democratic appointees are on DDD 
panels, the validation rate for conservative agency decisions is 54 
percent.32 (This 32 percent difference should be compared with the 
overall difference of 23 percent.33) When Republican appointees are 
on RRR panels, the validation rate for liberal agency decisions is 51 
percent; and on such panels, the validation rate for conservative 
agency decision is a remarkable 100 percent.34 
 
 29. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 849. 
 30. Id. at 826–27. 
 31. Id. at 859. 
 32. Id. at 855. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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Because of the relatively small sample size, the particular 
numbers here should be taken with a grain of salt, but they should be 
sufficient to show that unified panels are playing a large role in 
driving the results. The following point is sufficiently important to 
deserve italics: On mixed panels, politicized voting is greatly reduced; 
the behavior of Democratic appointees, on such panels, is very close to 
that of Republican appointees.35 In Chevron cases, the voting patterns 
of Republican appointees on RRD panels is close to the voting 
patterns of Republican appointees on RDD panels, and the voting 
patterns of Democratic appointees on DRR panels is close to that of 
Democratic appointees on DDR panels—and more remarkably still, 
all four voting patterns are close to one another.36 This finding 
suggests that on mixed panels, Chevron is essentially working, in the 
sense that politicized voting is modest at best. 
The dramatic difference between all-Republican and all-
Democratic panels presents an obvious puzzle. Why are judicial 
voting patterns relatively extreme on such panels and so much more 
moderate on mixed panels? We lack a complete answer, but judges 
appear to be influenced by the process of group polarization, which 
occurs when group members end up in a more extreme position in 
line with their predeliberation tendencies.37 Group polarization is the 
typical pattern within deliberating groups, and it occurs in a wide 
range of settings.38 If Democratic appointees show especially liberal 
voting patterns on panels consisting solely of Democratic appointees, 
it is likely because the judges’ initial inclinations are amplified, rather 
than moderated, by learning about the conclusions and arguments of 
other judges. On mixed panels, by contrast, a whistleblower effect 
may occur, in the form of presentation of counterarguments based 
(for example) on the principle of Chevron deference.39 Because the 
initial “argument pool” is different on a DDD panel from what it is 
on a DDR panel, it should not be entirely surprising that Democratic 
 
 35. Id. at 863. 
 36. Id. 
 37. ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 200–45 (2d ed. 1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY 
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 111–44 (2003). 
 38. See BROWN, supra note 37, at 244. 
 39. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2173–74 (1998). 
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appointees, on the latter kinds of panels, show relatively greater 
moderation.40 
C. Courts of Appeals: Arbitrariness Cases 
The pattern is strikingly similar in arbitrariness cases. Here the 
question is not whether the agency’s decision conforms to the 
governing statute, but whether its judgments of policy or fact are 
arbitrary on the merits (or unsupported by substantial evidence). 
Return to our three key tests for politicized voting, and notice the 
closely analogous pattern in Chevron cases: 
1. When the agency’s decision is liberal, the Democratic 
validation rate is 72 percent; when the agency’s decision is 
conservative, the rate falls to 55 percent. The pattern is the 
opposite for Republican appointees—very close to the mirror 
image. When the agency’s decision is liberal, the validation 
rate is 58 percent; when the agency’s decision is conservative, 
the validation rate jumps to 72 percent.41 
2. When the agency’s decision is liberal, Democratic appointees 
are 14 percent more likely to vote to validate it than are 
Republican appointees. When the agency’s decision is 
conservative, Democratic appointees are 17 percent less likely 
to validate it than are Republican appointees.42 
3. The overall liberal voting rate is 69 percent for Democratic 
appointees; for Republican appointees, it is 56 percent.43 
One of the most striking features of these findings is their 
similarity to those under Chevron; different areas of administrative 
law have produced parallel voting patterns. And here too, unified 
panels explain a significant part of these disparities. On politically 
unified panels of Democratic appointees, the average validation rate 
is 43 percentage points higher when the agency decision is liberal than 
when it is conservative.44 And on politically unified panels of 
 
 40. There are other possible explanations. It may be, for example, that Republican and 
Democratic appointees vote as they would as individuals on unified panels, and that what needs 
explanation is the absence of politicized voting on mixed panels. On this view, group 
polarization is not involved; mixed panels serve to moderate judges’ tendencies, and that is the 
key mechanism. For our purposes, it does not seem necessary to settle on a final explanation. 
 41. Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 1, at 767. 
 42. Id. at 777. 
 43. Id. at 791. 
 44. Id. at 788. 
SUNSTEIN_IN_FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:55:48 AM 
2009] DEPOLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2205 
Republican appointees, the average validation rate is 29 percentage 
points lower when the agency decision is liberal than when it is 
conservative.45 A form of group polarization seems to be at work in 
this domain. On mixed panels, by contrast, the partisan differences 
are greatly muted,46 perhaps because of a moderating or 
whistleblower effect. In those panels, existing doctrine is again 
“working,” in the sense that judges’ arbitrariness judgments do not 
greatly differ depending on the political affiliation of the appointing 
president. 
D. The Supreme Court47 
1. The Least and Most Partisan Justices.  The data on the 
Supreme Court allows individual comparisons among the Court’s 
members.48 Indeed, it is even possible to rank the Justices in terms of 
partisanship in Chevron cases.49 In this domain, it would seem 
reasonable to define the least partisan Justices as those who show the 
most similar validation rates for liberal and conservative agency 
decisions. By contrast, the most partisan might be defined as those 
who show the largest spreads between the two validation rates. 
Under this test, Justice Kennedy emerges as the least partisan of 
the sitting Justices; he is equally likely to vote to invalidate 
conservative and liberal agency decisions.50 Justice Thomas emerges 
as the most partisan; remarkably, he is 46 percent more likely to vote 
to invalidate liberal agency decisions than conservative agency 
decisions.51 Justice John Paul Stevens is not far behind, with a 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Seven of the Justices were appointed by Republican presidents: Justice David H. 
Souter, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Antonin Scalia. Justices 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer were appointed by Democratic President Clinton. 
 48. For an illuminating treatment, covering a large time period, see Eskridge & Baer, supra 
note 2, at 1153–57. 
 49. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 872–80 tbl.1. The data set extends from 
1989 to 2005, and hence Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito are not included. 
An effort to extend the study to the present would of course include a number of their votes, 
but the sample size, for those Justices, would remain too small to permit reliable comparisons. 
 50. Id. at 877 tbl.1. 
 51. Id. at 880 tbl.1. 
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stunning 40 percent difference in favor of liberal decisions.52 Consider 
the following table:53 
Table 1.  Partisan Voting in Chevron Cases on the Supreme Court. 
Justice Gap 
(in percentage points) 
Type of Agency 
Decision Favored 
Thomas 46 Conservative 
Stevens 40 Liberal 
Scalia 27 Conservative 
Breyer 26 Liberal 
Ginsburg 23 Liberal 
Rehnquist 21 Conservative 
O’Connor 14 Conservative 
Souter 14 Liberal 
Kennedy 1 — 
To be sure, this table should be taken with many grains of salt. 
The sample size is small, and for Justices O’Connor, Souter, and 
Kennedy, the gap is not statistically significant (and hence they could 
plausibly be said to share the prize for nonpartisan voting). Moreover, 
it is important to examine not only the size of the gap, but also the 
rate of invalidation; if a Justice shows a large gap, but is also willing to 
uphold both liberal and conservative decisions at a high rate, then the 
problem of partisanship is diminished. 
It turns out that Justice Breyer shows the highest validation rate 
(82 percent),54 while Justice Scalia shows the lowest (52 percent).55 
The point greatly matters because Justice Breyer’s validation rate 
remains reasonably high for conservative decisions (64 percent),56 as 
does that of Justice Ginsburg (58 percent).57 By contrast, Justice 
Scalia’s validation rate for liberal decisions is a meager 42 percent.58 It 
emerges that the existence of a significant partisan gap may coexist 
 
 52. Id. at 872 tbl.1. 
 53. Id. at 872–80 tbl.1. 
 54. Id. at 874 tbl.1. 
 55. Id. at 879 tbl.1. 
 56. Id. at 874 tbl.1. 
 57. Id. at 875 tbl.1. 
 58. Id. at 879 tbl.1. 
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with a relatively high validation rate for the “other side.” Consider 
the following table:59 
Table 2. Validation Rates in Chevron Cases on the Supreme Court. 
Justice Rate (percentage points) 
Breyer 82 
Souter 77 
Ginsburg 74 
Stevens 71 
O’Connor 68 
Kennedy 67 
Rehnquist 64 
Thomas 54 
Scalia 52 
Here too, however, the individual rankings must be taken with 
many grains of salt. The sample size is too small to make most of the 
individual differences statistically significant. But it is both intriguing 
and suggestive to find that the four most liberal Justices have the 
highest validation rates, while the three most conservative Justices 
have the lowest. 
2. Conservative Partisans, Liberal Partisans.  The individual 
rankings may be entertaining, but for purposes of understanding of 
operation of existing doctrine, it is more instructive to place the 
Court’s members into groups and to examine the differences between 
them. 
Let us compare the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas group with the 
Breyer-Ginsburg-Souter-Stevens group. The former group, consisting 
of the most conservative Justices, shows a validation rate of 76 
percent when the agency’s decision is conservative—but a 
corresponding rate of just 45.5 percent when the agency’s decision is 
liberal.60 This difference of 30.5 percent shows a remarkable effect of 
judicial policy preferences. The picture is not fundamentally different 
for the Breyer-Ginsburg-Souter-Stevens group. When the agency 
decision is liberal, the validation rate is 85 percent—but when it is 
conservative, the rate falls to 58 percent.61 The disparity here is 27 
percent, very close to that on the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas side. In 
 
 59. Id. at 872–80 tbl.1. 
 60. Id. at 835. 
 61. Id. 
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contrast, for the two more centrist members of the Court, Justices 
Kennedy and O’Connor, the partisan gap is small, with a 65 percent 
validation rate for liberal agency decisions and a 72 percent validation 
rate for conservative agency decisions; that 7 percent difference is not 
statistically significant.62 
Partisan voting is readily apparent in the Supreme Court in 
Chevron cases, but as with individual measures, it is important to look 
at overall validation rates, not merely at gaps. Notably, the overall 
validation rate for Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg is 75 
percent, significantly higher than the 57 percent rate for Rehnquist, 
Scalia, and Thomas.63 The former group votes to validate conservative 
agency decisions at a 58 percent rate, which is significantly higher 
than the 45.5 percent validation rate for liberal agency decisions from 
the latter group.64 
3. A Brief Note on Politics, Judicial Review, and the Future.  In 
light of the existing data, we can venture some predictions about the 
future. Suppose that a future administration issues a range of liberal 
decisions (in the sense that they are challenged by regulated 
industries). Such an administration will be highly vulnerable before 
RRR panels, and will be likely to do far better before DDD panels. 
To the extent that the federal courts of appeals consist of a strong 
majority of Republican appointees, an administration that issues 
many liberal decisions will have special difficulty in prevailing. This is 
a purely predictive point; of course people will differ about whether 
and to what extent it would be a cause for concern. 
Within the Supreme Court, it is also simple to predict the nature 
of the internal divisions. We lack sufficient data to offer predictions 
for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, but at least 
in administrative law, it is more than mere guesswork to suggest that 
both liberal and conservative agency decisions from a new 
administration will produce the same kind of politicized voting, within 
the Court, as has been observed under recent administrations. It 
would not be at all surprising to find, for example, that a new 
Democratic administration would suffer a number of losses in the 
Court, at least if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito show the 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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anticipated voting patterns, and if Justice Kennedy joins them a 
significant percentage of the time. 
II.  FIVE MATTERS OF INTERPRETATION 
At first glance, the most important lesson is plain: judicial review 
of administrative action shows a strong effect from the political 
inclinations of federal judges. In the abstract, this lesson is not exactly 
stunning. The problem is that existing administrative law principles 
are best understood as a self-conscious effort to prevent this state of 
affairs. Under Chevron, courts are supposed to invalidate agency 
interpretations of law only if the governing statute is clear or if the 
interpretation is unreasonable.65 The doctrine and the practice sharply 
diverge because the doctrine is an effort to prevent the kinds of 
disparities now observed on both the Supreme Court and the courts 
of appeals. And as the Court understands the “arbitrary or 
capricious” standard, agency judgments of policy and fact are to be 
invalidated if they are unreasonable or senseless, not because they 
run afoul of judicial policy preferences.66 Here too the doctrine and 
the practice sharply diverge, at least on the courts of appeals, where 
statistical tests are possible. In an especially important domain, we 
seem to have vindicated certain claims about judicial policy 
preferences associated with the legal realist movement.67 
The partisan voting patterns seem to call out for some kind of 
remedy. But of course the evidence is not simple to interpret. 
Consider five difficulties. 
A. Who Is Partisan? 
Begin with voting patterns on the Supreme Court. Is it altogether 
clear that Justices Thomas and Stevens are the most partisan or that 
the two opposing “blocks” show high (and nearly equivalent) levels of 
 
 65. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) 
(explaining that a reviewing court must ask “[f]irst . . . whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue,” and if it has not, whether the agency’s interpretation is 
“reasonable”). 
 66. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court 
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). 
 67. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 846–50 (providing empirical support for the 
contention that judicial policy preferences play a role in judges’ decisions about whether 
agencies have behaved unreasonably). 
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partisan voting? A skeptic would insist that in order to answer that 
question, we cannot simply stare at the numbers.68 We also need to 
know something about the merits—about whether agencies are 
actually interpreting statutes correctly. If, for example, liberal agency 
decisions are more likely to be inconsistent with the statutory text, 
then Justice Scalia and Thomas, who seem to show a significant 
partisan “skew” in their voting patterns, might be neutral in their 
practice, whatever the numbers suggest. Or if conservative agency 
decisions are more typically inconsistent with the law, then Justice 
Stevens might be the nonpartisan one notwithstanding the 40 percent 
gap reflected in his voting pattern. The various rankings assume that 
liberal agency decisions and conservative agency decisions are equally 
likely to be inconsistent with the law. Why should we believe that this 
assumption is correct? 
The same point holds for the courts of appeals. It is true that 
Republican appointees are more likely to vote to uphold conservative 
agency decisions than liberal ones and that Democratic appointees 
show the opposite pattern. But to evaluate this finding, it would be 
important to learn about the nature of the EPA and NLRB decisions 
in the relevant period. Perhaps one set of decisions is systematically 
likely to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Perhaps partisan voting is 
limited to one or another side; perhaps Republican appointees or 
Democratic appointees are simply applying the law. 
Even if this objection turns out to be valid, the problem of 
partisan voting remains; the only qualification would be that such 
voting would be limited to one or another set of judges. Moreover, it 
is unlikely that the objection is valid, at least in its most ambitious 
forms. Neither the Supreme Court nor the courts of appeals reviews 
all EPA and NLRB decisions, or even a majority of them. Within the 
Court, the sample is generally limited to cases that are both important 
and difficult, and to be seen as worth litigating by both sides; in such 
cases, a consistent error rate, from one or another side, would be a 
surprise. Within the lower courts, reasonable arguments are usually 
made on behalf of the competing views. From our own reading of the 
cases, it does not seem that liberal agency decisions or conservative 
 
 68. This point is put in a broader context in a highly instructive essay by Professor Posner. 
Eric Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for 
Political and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 870 (2008) (“[I]t should now be 
clear that evaluating justices is more complicated than counting up their liberal and conservative 
votes.”). 
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ones are systematically more likely to be in violation of the governing 
statute (or the clear text) or arbitrary as a matter of fact or policy. To 
be sure, a careful investigation of the merits might require some 
amendments of the basic account we are offering, but the significant 
differences in voting patterns are most unlikely to be understandable 
in terms that neglect the political predictions of federal judges. 
B. How Large a Problem? 
It is legitimate to wonder about the magnitude of the problem. If 
Republican appointees showed a 10 percent liberal voting rate and 
Democratic appointees a 90 percent liberal voting rate, there would 
be good reason for alarm. But the overall partisan difference is far 
smaller than that—17 percent in the Chevron cases69 and 12 percent in 
the arbitrariness cases.70 Is that difference large enough to justify 
reforms or even substantial concern? It is clear that Democratic 
appointees are voting in favor of companies and against public 
interest groups in a large percentage of cases (about one-third of the 
time in the entire data set)—and that Republican appointees are 
often voting in favor of public interest groups and against companies 
(over two-fifths of the time in the entire data set).71 Far more often 
than not, the two sets of judges are in accord. Is there a serious 
problem to be solved? 
This question might be pressed with special concern by those 
who emphasize the selection of cases for litigation.72 People (and their 
lawyers) are unlikely to challenge agency action unless they have a 
significant chance of success. Agencies are unlikely to proceed in the 
first instance unless they have a plausible legal basis for doing so. The 
cases studied here are a small sliver or band of imaginable disputes, 
consisting only of those agency decisions that litigants are prepared to 
challenge and that agencies are prepared to defend. In such cases, 
even a significant disparity between Republican and Democratic 
voting patterns should not be taken as politics run rampant. 
The point is correct. But it should not be overstated. In one 
sense, our estimates understate the actual influence of ideology, for 
the reason that we have just identified. When an agency must defend 
 
 69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 849 tbl.7.  
 72. For a discussion, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.  
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a liberal decision before a conservative court, it is more likely to 
settle, and when an agency must defend a conservative decision 
before a liberal court, it is more likely to settle. The observed court 
decisions are therefore drawn from cases in which settlement is less 
likely, and the set of observed decisions does not encompass these 
cases (we do not know exactly how many there are) in which the 
judicial outcome would likely be predictably ideological. Were we to 
observe a counterfactual world in which these settling cases 
proceeded, the observed decisions would include a larger share of 
(and thus a higher rate of) predictably ideological judicial decisions. 
Moreover, it remains true that notwithstanding the evident 
aspiration of both Chevron and State Farm, politicized voting patterns 
are both significant and unmistakable in the federal courts, at least on 
unified panels. Recall that in Chevron cases, a Democratic appointee 
on a unified panel is 32 percent more likely to vote in favor of liberal 
agency decisions (86 percent validation rate) than conservative agency 
decisions (54 percent validation rate)—and that a Republican 
appointee on a unified panel is 49 percent more likely to vote in favor 
of conservative agency decisions (100 percent validation rate) than 
liberal agency decisions (51 percent validation rate).73 In a system 
committed to the rule of law, and to similar treatment of the similarly 
situated, this is a serious problem. 
C. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Empirical tests can easily study decisions ex post, to see what 
kinds of voting patterns are displayed by federal judges. But an 
important question, and perhaps an even more important one, 
involves the ex ante incentives imposed on federal agencies. On an 
optimistic account, the situation is far better ex ante than ex post. 
As things now stand, agencies can be seen to face a kind of 
lottery. Within a certain range, their decisions will certainly be 
upheld, no matter the composition of the panel; and if the agency 
plainly violates the statutory text or acts in a patently arbitrary way, 
its decision will be invalidated, regardless of who sits on the reviewing 
court. And across a certain space of alternatives, there will be some 
uncertainty, with a range of probabilities of invalidation, depending 
on the composition of the panel. In that range, the agency’s lawyers 
might be prepared to conclude that the relevant decision can be 
 
 73. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
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plausibly defended. Within a certain domain of that range, the 
lawyers will add that the decision is more likely than not, or less likely 
than not, to be upheld in court. But they might be prepared to 
acknowledge, if pressed, that the likelihood of validation is well above 
50 percent before a panel consisting solely of Republican appointees 
and well below 50 percent before a panel consisting solely of 
Democratic appointees. 
In these circumstances, how will the agency proceed? To answer 
that question, we need to know something about the weight given to 
the prospect of invalidation and about the agency’s attitude toward 
risk. Exactly how much does the agency care about surviving judicial 
review? Is the agency risk averse or risk inclined? The agency will 
face a probability distribution, and it will act in accordance with the 
perceived risks. Suppose that for various reasons, the agency cares a 
great deal about ensuring validation and also that the agency is risk 
neutral. If the risk of invalidation is 60 percent before an all-
Democratic panel, but 35 percent before an all-Republican panel, an 
agency can make the relevant calculations and proceed accordingly. 
The overall likelihood of invalidation, given all the possible panel 
compositions, might be 40 percent; and the agency might proceed as it 
would, in the face of that risk, even if every possible panel was 40 
percent likely to invalidate its decision. The key point is that whatever 
the disparities across panels, there is an overall likelihood of 
invalidation, and the agency can act with that figure in mind, just as it 
would without such disparities. From the ex ante point of view, then, 
what is the problem with politicized voting? 
Here is another way to put the point. While we are unaware of 
any empirical evidence on the question, agencies are likely to be 
aware of the distribution of views on the federal judiciary, and if the 
judiciary takes a sharp turn in one or another direction, agencies will 
be affected. If, for example, a Democratic administration faced a 
judiciary consisting mostly of Republican appointees, it would behave 
differently from how it would behave if the judiciary consisted mostly 
of Democratic appointees. And if politicized voting exists on a 
judiciary within a specified distribution among Republican and 
Democratic appointees, agencies will adjust accordingly. Without 
politicized voting, there will be a certain likelihood of invalidation, 
which agency lawyers might be able to specify; the same is true with 
politicized voting. So long as agencies are attuned to the relevant 
problems, there does not seem to be a great deal of difficulty ex ante. 
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Three potential problems remain. A first concern is the 
possibility that the panel lottery agencies face may not be a fair game. 
If the composition of the federal courts were disproportionately 
Republican (or Democratic), an agency would not have an equal 
probability of facing a DDD and an RRR panel. A politically 
unbalanced judiciary, as distinguished from a politically unbalanced 
panel, implies shifts in the range of decisions that an agency can 
expect will be validated. To continue the example above, if the risks 
of invalidation before all-Democratic and all-Republican panels 
remain unchanged, but the incidence of all-Democratic and all-
Republican panels change, the expected likelihood of invalidation 
might rise from 40 percent to 60 percent. Or it might fall to 20 
percent. It would remain true that agencies could know, ex ante, 
about their probability of success. And it might be responded that 
shifts in the composition of the federal judiciary are a legitimate 
response to shifts in public opinion, as reflected in the inclinations of 
the occupant of the White House. But movements in the expected 
chance of invalidation are troubling to the extent that the agency’s ex 
ante prediction of its likelihood of success will shift with the expected 
composition of the reviewing court. 
Second, politicized voting by panels will influence the amount of 
resources an agency invests in rendering decisions and defending 
them in court. If the agency is risk averse, or if the risk of partisan 
invalidation is high, an agency may double its efforts to demonstrate 
the validity of its action. The additional resources spent bolstering its 
decision exceed the investment the agency would have had it 
anticipated facing a nonpoliticized panel. This sort of additional 
expenditure seems more likely to occur in rulemaking rather than 
adjudication. But the primary point is that a risk of politicized voting 
will likely increase the effort devoted to showing reasonableness 
beyond what would be spent in its absence. These additional 
resources of course have an opportunity cost. They are drawn away 
from other activities that the agency would otherwise pursue. Defense 
of a clean-air regulation may come at the expense of creating a clean-
water regulation. For resource-constrained agencies—as all agencies 
are—the possibility of a politicized panel could distort an agency’s 
allocation decisions.74 
 
 74. Naturally, the argument works the other way for politicized voting that favors an 
agency. An increase in the chance that an agency faces a friendly reviewer may reduce the 
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Third, politicized voting by panels may affect the content of 
agency decisions. An agency may decide in good faith that a 
particular policy would improve social welfare. But if the risk of a 
politicized invalidation is high, the agency may decide that the 
resources required to establish the validity of the policy before a 
potentially hostile court are too great. The agency may then modify 
the decision to make it more palatable to the expected panel but at 
the cost of a reduced improvement in social welfare. Or the agency 
may choose to forgo the decision altogether. In either case, politicized 
review would result in the agency’s curbing a socially beneficial 
decision. There is ample evidence that effects of this sort do in fact 
occur.75 
In addition to these ex ante consequences, the ex post 
perspective matters as well. If important EPA rules are invalidated by 
all-Democratic panels, while they would be upheld by all-Republican 
panels, similarly situated litigants will be treated differently in a way 
that ensures that the meaning of federal statutes turns on a kind of 
lottery. If NLRB decisions are won by unions before DDD panels, 
but by companies before RRR panels, something is seriously amiss. 
Even if the current regime does not have significantly different 
incentive effects from one with less politicized voting, it does serious 
violence to the rule of law, and it has a significant effect on ultimate 
outcomes. 
D. Invalidations or Validations? 
An independent question is whether the best reading of the 
evidence emphasizes politicized invalidations. We have seen that the 
Republican invalidation rate jumps when the agency decision is 
liberal, and the Democratic invalidation rate jumps when the agency 
decision is conservative. These points suggest that agencies are 
probably losing many cases that they ought to win. But it is possible 
that what has been uncovered are politically motivated validations. 
Perhaps the real story is the relatively low invalidation rate when 
 
resources an agency spends in establishing the validity of its decision, and this may be 
undesirable when closer inquiry is warranted. 
 75. The best discussion remains the book by Professors Mashaw and Harfst. JERRY L. 
MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225 (1990) (discussing the 
effects of aggressive judicial review on agency rulemaking, and noting that “[t]he result of 
judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality has been a general suppression of the use of 
rules”). 
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Republican appointees review conservative regulations and when 
Democratic appointees review liberal ones. Perhaps conservative 
decisions are being wrongly validated before all-Republican panels; 
perhaps liberal agency decisions are being wrongly validated before 
all-Democratic panels. Indeed, it is possible, in light of the data, that 
the more serious problem consists of excessive numbers of 
validations. 
This point is indeed consistent with the evidence, and it has 
important implications for possible responses. We will return to the 
question in Part III.B.2. 
E. Second-Order Diversity 
Sometimes it is desirable to have diversity within institutions—as, 
for example, in the context of national legislatures. But sometimes it 
is desirable to have diversity across institutions—as, for example, in a 
situation in which Massachusetts attempts some educational reforms 
and Utah ventures others, or different law schools or economics 
departments develop different “schools.” Professor Heather Gerken 
has written illuminatingly of the idea of “second-order diversity,”76 
which exists when different institutions, with a degree of internal 
unity, produce a kind of diversity from which society as a whole might 
benefit. In some cases, second-order diversity should be the goal, not 
first order. If, for example, society is able to learn a great deal from 
institutions that are internally unified but different from one another, 
and if those institutions do not do much damage to anyone, then 
second-order diversity might be better than its first-order cousin. 
In administrative law, we can find a high degree of second-order 
diversity, made possible by unified panels. Might this be desirable? 
Consider the following account. With unified panels, a large number 
of ideas will inevitably make their way onto the pages of federal court 
opinions. RRR panels will offer distinctive interpretations of the 
Clean Air Act and the National Labor Relations Act; DDD panels 
will offer distinctive interpretations of their own. Perhaps the legal 
system benefits from this level of diversity. When courts of appeals 
are divided, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide, with the 
 
 76. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity and Disaggregated Democracy, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1102–03 (2005) (explaining “first-order diversity” as “the normative vision 
associated with statistical integration, the hope that democratic bodies will someday mirror the 
polity” and “second-order diversity” as “involv[ing] variation among decisionmaking bodies, 
not within them . . . . [and] foster[ing] diversity without mandating uniformity”). 
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benefit of the additional information provided by a wide array of 
views within the lower courts. 
In some domains, this defense of second-order diversity within 
the federal courts has a great deal of plausibility. In constitutional 
law, for example, the system as a whole probably benefits from RRR 
and DDD panels, which produce a range of disparate analyses of 
issues involving the Second Amendment, abortion, affirmative action, 
campaign finance regulation, and much more. The Supreme Court 
and the culture as a whole benefit from such analyses. But the 
defense is far less plausible in the context of administrative law. In 
almost all of the relevant cases, the decision of the court of appeals is 
effectively final, because the Supreme Court hears only an 
exceedingly small percentage of them, and most turn on complex 
issues of fact or policy or on relatively technical issues of statutory 
construction. If an RRR panel concludes that the NLRB improperly 
found the facts and rules in favor of a company challenging a finding 
of an unfair labor practice, or if a DDD panel rejects the EPA’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act in favor of that offered by the 
Sierra Club, the likelihood of some social benefit from a hypothetical 
increase in “diversity” is very low. In these circumstances, it is not 
easy to defend the status quo by reference to the interest in second-
order diversity. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
Let us now turn to sets of solutions. The first involves self-
correction without doctrinal change, brought about by judges’ own 
understanding of the problem of politicized administrative law. The 
second set includes doctrinal responses, taking the form of new 
developments involving the governing legal principles. The third and 
most ambitious set involves institutional innovation, as, for example, 
through voting rules or requirements of mixed panels. The fourth set 
focuses on the confirmation process. 
An important point before we begin: evaluation of any solutions 
must be based not only on their content, but also on an understanding 
of who, exactly, is implementing those solutions. Self-correction 
would of course be possible without legislative change or any kind of 
direction from the Supreme Court. Doctrinal changes would require 
the Court to reformulate or at least to clarify the underlying 
principles. Voting rules, or requirements of mixed panels, might well 
require congressional action. Solutions that call for large-scale 
SUNSTEIN_IN_FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:55:48 AM 
2218 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2193 
institutional change might run into objections from the standpoint of 
feasibility, if only because such change is difficult to produce. 
A. Self-Correction 
1. Knowledge as Corrective, Sunlight as Disinfectant.  Some of the 
evidence catalogued here should be taken as highly embarrassing to 
the federal judiciary. Most federal judges would not like to think that 
in reviewing agency action, their voting patterns show a significant 
influence from the party affiliation of the president who appointed 
them. Perhaps a better understanding of the situation could provide a 
safeguard against politicized voting. On an optimistic view, judicial 
awareness of the underlying patterns might provide a degree of help; 
it might even produce a form of “debiasing.” Justice Louis Brandeis 
famously said that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”77 
Perhaps a little sunlight, with respect to voting patterns, might induce 
a degree of self-consciousness and self-scrutiny, thus reducing 
politicized voting. At the very least, the data suggest that judges on 
unified panels should be cautious about behaving in a way that fits 
with partisan predictions. 
Here is the basic idea. There are many demonstrations of 
politicized voting, undertaken by those who have studied judicial 
voting patterns, and they continue to be undertaken. These 
demonstrations might become generally known, as the key findings 
are found in scholarly outlets or the popular media. To the extent that 
RRR and DDD panels are pervasively found to show an ideological 
skew, judges might be made aware of that fact. And if that occurs, the 
relevant behavior might change. 
This is certainly possible, but there is no reason for confidence in 
this prospect. It is an understatement to say that most judges do not 
spend a great deal of time reading academic work, and studies of 
judicial behavior are not likely to come to their attention. And even if 
some judges become aware of relevant studies, perhaps through more 
popular outlets, a significant effect on their behavior would be 
surprising. No one should doubt that judges act in good faith, and 
when they vote to strike down or to uphold agency action, they are 
behaving in accordance with the law as they understand it. Note that 
Supreme Court Justices are the judges subject to the most persistent 
 
 77. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (1914). 
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scrutiny by both the public and by a professional class of experts. Yet 
they remain consistently ideological in their voting. Perhaps an 
improved understanding of the degree of politicized voting could 
produce some good, but it is unlikely to make a significant 
contribution to solving the problem. 
2. Warning Flags and Reviewing the Reviewers.  A mildly more 
aggressive response would be to suggest that when a DDD panel or 
an RRR panel goes in the expected direction, a warning flag has been 
raised, one that justifies some form of oversight and review. Suppose, 
for example, that a RRR panel has struck down some regulation from 
the EPA, accepting a company’s claim that the regulation is arbitrary 
or in violation of statute. If the EPA seeks en banc or Supreme Court 
review, there is special reason to take the request seriously. Or if a 
DDD panel has acted in a predictable fashion in an important case 
involving the NLRB, and the NLRB seeks certiorari, the Court has 
an additional reason to wonder about whether the panel might have 
erred. 
It is true that there are evident risks with giving a great deal of 
weight to panel composition. What matters is the court’s conclusion 
and analysis, not the political affiliation of the appointing president. 
At the same time, the existence of a unified panel, reaching the 
predictable conclusion, does provide a signal that the conclusion and 
the analysis might be skewed. Indeed, it is likely that judgments about 
en banc review, and about whether to grant certiorari, are sometimes 
influenced by an appreciation of the composition of the panel. But 
this response would be at best a partial response to the politicized-
voting situation. It would impose on agencies the perhaps 
considerable costs of appeal, an expense that would be spared if 
politicized decisions were avoided in the first instance. En banc 
review is necessarily rare, and agencies seek Supreme Court review 
infrequently, especially when their decision is invalidated as arbitrary 
or capricious; such invalidations depend on particular facts and are 
most unlikely to attract the Court’s attention.78 Even when agencies 
appeal, as we have seen, the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only a 
 
 78. Robert J. Hume, Administrative Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court: The Importance of 
Legal Signals, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 625, 632–33 (2007) (explaining that petitions are 
less likely to occur when a court invalidates an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious 
because, “[u]nlike cases based on the Constitution, an agency’s interpretation of a statute, or 
some other substantive grounds, cases that require an agency to improve its reasoning are 
normally viewed as frivolous by the Justices and denied review”). 
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small fraction of cases.79 A warning flag may well be appropriate, but 
it cannot suffice to eliminate politicized voting. 
3. Political Rankings.  We have ranked Supreme Court Justices 
in terms of politicized voting, and it would be possible to be far more 
systematic in this vein, covering lower courts as well. Rankings might 
increase the transparency of the courts, which might enhance the 
public’s understanding of the judiciary, and importantly, might give 
judges an additional reason to reflect before rendering decisions that 
fit with political expectations. Such rankings might be offered in 
scholarly journals or in more popular outlets. 
On the other hand, judicial rankings run into some serious 
objections. They may erode public confidence in courts; for some 
observers, rankings might supplant evaluation of judicial opinions and 
reinforce a cynical view that law is always politics in the crudest sense. 
Rankings might serve to distract judges from rendering decisions in 
accordance with law and encourage them to burnish their public 
perception as neutral. Finally, the statistics underlying any rankings 
are likely to be too crude, failing to capture important dimensions of 
judicial judgment. 
B. Doctrinal Solutions 
1. Rethinking Mead.  Chevron was intended to eliminate the role 
of judicial policy judgments from review of agency action; it has failed 
to do so. At the same time, the Court has retreated, in significant 
ways, from the Chevron framework by reducing deference in certain 
classes of cases. A relatively modest doctrinal response to the 
situation described here would be to rethink the Court’s most serious 
retreat, in United States v. Mead Corp.,80 on the ground that it has a 
serious unanticipated side effect, which is to increase the 
politicization of administrative law. 
To make a long and complex story too short and simple,81 Mead 
draws a distinction between two kinds of deference to agency 
interpretations of law. The higher form of deference, reflected in 
Chevron itself, applies when agencies have exercised delegated 
 
 79. Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 1143, 1194 & n.215 (2005). 
 80. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 81. For details, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 
(2006). 
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authority to make rules or to promulgate orders.82 The lower form of 
deference, reflected in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,83 might apply when 
agencies have not exercised such authority; the word “might” is 
necessary because the Court has not established clear ground rules.84 
An apparent rationale of Mead is that if agencies have gone through 
rulemaking procedures or through the adjudicative process, we have 
some guarantee of fairness and deliberation, in a way that justifies 
heightened deference.85 If agencies have not gone through the 
relevant processes, perhaps the risk of unfairness or unreasonableness 
is heightened, in a way that justifies a firmer judicial hand. 
The distinction between Skidmore and Chevron raises many 
complexities, and the doctrine is producing a great deal of confusion 
in the lower courts.86 Intuition and common sense suggest another 
problem: it would appear likely that Skidmore review, authorized by 
Mead, may well ensure not a firmer judicial hand, but a situation in 
which judicial policy preferences play a (still) larger role than they do 
under Chevron. To evaluate this speculation, a great deal of empirical 
work would be necessary. But if Chevron has at least some kind of 
disciplining effect on judicial policy judgments, then Mead is likely to 
increase politicization. 
What does current evidence show? A noteworthy fact: on the 
Supreme Court itself, politicized voting does not seem to be greater 
under Skidmore than under Chevron. The Stevens-Souter-Breyer-
Ginsburg group shows a 27 percent greater willingness to validate 
liberal agency decisions than conservative agency decisions under 
Chevron; the corresponding figure is 23 percent under Skidmore.87 
 
 82. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 83. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). An exceedingly valuable empirical study 
is Kristin Hickman & Matthew Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007). 
 84. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (“The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its 
own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the 
degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 85. See id. at 229–30 (characterizing express congressional authorizations of notice-and-
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication as “good indicator[s] of delegation meriting 
Chevron treatment” because they “tend[] to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force”). 
 86. See Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 347 (2003) 
(calling the D.C. Circuit’s “Mead-related work product . . . in a nontrivial number of cases, 
flawed or incoherent”). 
 87. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 846. 
SUNSTEIN_IN_FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:55:48 AM 
2222 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2193 
The Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas group shows a 30 percent greater 
willingness to validate conservative agency decisions than liberal 
agency decisions under Chevron; the difference is 37 percent under 
Skidmore.88 Because of the small numbers of votes, neither of these 
differences is statistically significant. 
We do not know whether greater differences would be found in 
the lower courts; the issue would be well worth investigating. No clear 
evidence shows whether courts that use Skidmore, rather than 
Chevron, end up with more invalidations, greater politicization, or 
both. But it is possible that the use of Skidmore, rather than Chevron, 
does not create more in the way of either invalidations or politicized 
voting. Further empirical work would be extremely helpful in this 
domain.89 
The more general point is that politicized voting remains high 
under Chevron, and hence the doctrinal shift from Skidmore to 
Chevron would not be likely to do a great deal to reduce the problem. 
The key data involve voting patterns under Chevron, and more 
general use of the Chevron framework would seem to leave those 
patterns intact. 
2. Increased Deference. 
 a. The Central Idea.  A natural response to the data would be to 
argue for increased deference, or a kind of “super-Chevron,” in the 
relevant domains. If Republican appointees are invalidating liberal 
agency decisions at a high rate, and if Democratic appointees are 
invalidating conservative agency decisions at a high rate, then we 
might want more deferential review from both sides. If the evident 
aspiration of Chevron has failed, there seems to be strong reason to 
reduce the intensity of judicial review of agency interpretations of 
law. And if arbitrariness review is being conducted in a way that 
shows a significant effect from judicial policy preferences, then the 
most obvious response would be to reduce the intensity of such 
review. What is now a “hard look” might be transformed into a “soft 
look.” 
There are, however, three objections to this recommendation.90 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Relevant data and arguments can be found in Eskridge & Baer, supra note 2 passim. 
 90. A possible doctrinal solution, in some domains, would be to prefer rules over 
standards. It has been shown that this approach can serve to reduce the effects of judicial 
ideology. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of 
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 b. Objections.  The first objection is that a degree of politicization 
may be a necessary price to pay for forms of judicial review that have 
otherwise desirable consequences. Increased deference may, for 
example, eliminate a valuable ex ante deterrent to careless or 
arbitrary decisions at the agency level.91 The benefits of that deterrent 
effect may outweigh the costs of politicized review. We have seen that 
in a sense, agencies face an ex ante “policy lottery” once their 
decisions are challenged because they cannot know whether the panel 
will be RRR, DDD, RRD, or DDR. The existence of that lottery is 
likely to ensure better decisions simply because of a certain 
probability of invalidation. The point applies both to agency 
interpretations of law and agency judgments of policy and fact. In 
both cases, agencies are likely to be disciplined by the existing 
standards of review. To put the point another way: the correlations 
between judicial ideology and validation rates do not demonstrate 
that all things considered, the current doctrinal balance between 
judicial ideology and agency error is inappropriate. Even if we could 
reduce those correlations, we might not be satisfied, because the risk 
of agency error might increase. 
The second objection is that statistical patterns of the sort 
described here might rematerialize even with increased deference. 
Indeed, reduced deference might produce precisely the same 
patterns. Even after a decision to strengthen Chevron deference, new 
researchers might discern politicized voting of the same level that we 
have reported here. The reason is that litigants should be expected to 
adjust their behavior to the existing standard of review.92 If deference 
were increased, some cases would not be brought that were brought 
before the increase, and the level of validation might therefore 
remain identical. And in the (by hypothesis close) cases that would be 
brought under the new standard, political judgments might inevitably 
 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008). In the context at hand, however, it 
is difficult to see how this solution might be made to work. 
 91. William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 
60 (1975) (“It is a great tonic to a program to discover that even if a regulation can be slipped or 
wrestled through various layers of internal or external review [inside the bureaucracy] . . . the 
final and most prestigious reviewing forum of all—a circuit court of appeals—will inquire into 
the minute details of methodology. . . .”). 
 92. See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges, supra note 1, at 869 (“[S]o long as there is some room 
for review, political differences will matter at the point where that review occurs. If, for 
example, the agency must be upheld unless the statute is entirely without ambiguity, then 
litigants will challenge agency action only when the statute is (arguably) entirely without 
ambiguity, and then agencies will interpret statutes aggressively in their preferred directions.”). 
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play a role, producing disparities of the sort we have described. In fact 
we might even venture an invariance hypothesis: because litigants 
adjust their behavior to the existing standard of review, the level of 
validations and the degree of politicized voting will be unaffected by 
that standard. 
It is not clear that this invariance proposition is correct.93 If 
judicial review were entirely unavailable, of course, there would be no 
politicized voting. But if judicial review were available but 
exceptionally deferential, is it obvious that the rate of validation and 
politicized voting would remain constant? The answer depends on the 
responsiveness of litigants and agencies to changes in the scope of 
review. If neither litigants nor agencies are highly responsive, we 
should expect that increased deference would increase validation 
rates and decrease politicized voting. If litigants are highly responsive, 
but agencies are not, we might expect that increased deference would 
have little effect. However we analyze the details, the general 
objection is straightforward: an increase in deference might have little 
or no effect on politicized voting. 
The best response to this objection is that even if the statistics 
remain the same, the politicized voting is in an important sense less 
damaging, because with greater deference, agencies are given greater 
room to maneuver from Republican appointees and Democratic 
appointees alike. A softening of review should ensure that political 
differences among the two sets of appointees would have a 
correspondingly smaller effect on ultimate outcomes. Even if the 
statistical analysis looks the same, a softening of review would ensure 
a reduced effect from politicized voting. 
The third objection is that the real problem may be politicized 
validations, not politicized invalidations, and if this is so, then more 
deferential review would seem perverse. As we have suggested, 
nothing in the evidence outlined here demonstrates that the level of 
validations is too high. The real story may be the deferential approach 
of RRR panels to conservative agency decisions and of DDD panels 
to liberal agency decisions. If this is so, then a softening of review may 
be affirmatively perverse, because it will increase the deference of 
RRR and DDD panels to decisions to which they are already too 
deferential. 
 
 93. See id. at 869–70 (discussing “[t]he inevitability of politics”). 
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 c. Evaluation.  It emerges that a general increase in deference 
should reduce disparities in politicized invalidations. To that extent, it 
would indeed be responsive to a plausible reading of the evidence 
sketched here. But the price of this gain may be too large; to answer 
that question, we need to know more about what is gained and what 
is lost. And for those who are concerned about politically motivated 
validations, increased deference would sacrifice a great deal. We are 
left with the conclusion that both RRR and DDD panels should be 
careful about both validations and invalidations that square with their 
predicted inclinations, but with an understanding that a softening of 
judicial review is not fully justified by, or an adequate response to, 
evidence of politicized voting. Our own conclusion, admittedly not 
compelled by the data, is that some softening of review would be 
warranted, because politicized invalidations are the most serious 
problem. Most of the time, it is more troublesome if courts are 
striking down agency action than upholding it, because the political 
process contains a range of safeguards against arbitrary or unlawful 
action in the first instance. 
C. Institutional Solutions 
Perhaps the best solution does not involve self-help or doctrinal 
change; perhaps it is institutional. But what form would an 
institutional solution take? And how would we produce that solution? 
We can imagine several possibilities. 
1. Clearer Statutes.  If Congress spoke unambiguously, partisan 
voting should not be anticipated, because all judges would agree 
about statutory meaning. Recall that in most administrative law cases 
in the data set, Republican and Democratic appointees agree. 
Certainly in a regime governed by Chevron, truly unambiguous 
statutes would not produce divisions between RRR and DDD panels. 
Indeed, truly unambiguous statutes would not need Chevron to 
squelch those divisions. Perhaps the lesson of politicized voting is 
simple: Congress should legislate more clearly. 
But there are two problems with this solution—one small, the 
other large. The small one is that because of the selection point, 
political voting should be expected in those cases that end up being 
litigated. This is a small point because even if we see such voting, it 
would be along a modest margin; the stakes would be lowered. The 
larger point is that there are formidable objections to the idea that 
Congress should enact clearer statutes. In many cases, Congress lacks 
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the information to legislate with particularity, and greater specificity 
would likely diminish social welfare rather than increase it.94 Greater 
specificity on Congress’s part may well ensure that committees, some 
of them highly susceptible to interest-group power,95 would be 
responsible for the content of federal law.96 It is true that 
unambiguous legislation would reduce politicized voting, but it would 
also have a series of undesirable consequences. 
2. Supermajorities.  Might voting rules help? In an illuminating 
essay, Professors Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule argue that the 
goals of the Chevron approach might be implemented, not through 
doctrine, but through a special voting rule.97 Suppose that agency 
action could not be struck down, under the Chevron framework, 
unless all three judges supported that result. At first glance, a 
unanimity requirement would ensure against politicized invalidations. 
It follows that if the goal is to depoliticize administrative law, a voting 
rule might do far better than doctrinal innovation. And if judicial 
review of agency action for arbitrariness shows a political bias, a 
voting rule would seem to be a sensible solution. Perhaps agency 
action should not be invalidated as arbitrary unless all three judges, 
on a three-judge panel, can be persuaded to vote for invalidation. 
In some domains, a special voting rule would undoubtedly make 
a great deal of sense. Unfortunately, the proposal runs into several 
objections. There is an obvious practical problem: who would enact a 
supermajority requirement? Judges are unlikely to have either the 
desire or the will to do so. At first glance, Congress would have to 
implement this response, and legislation to this effect seems most 
unlikely, in part because well-organized private groups would work 
 
 94. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1745–48 (2002). 
 95. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the 
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 798 (1990) 
(“Students of Congress have long contended that interest group influence flourishes at the 
committee level . . . .”); Ken Kollman, Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological 
Bias, and Congressional Committees, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 519, 522 (1997) (“[A] general 
consensus exists . . . that interest groups are vital to many committee decisions.”). 
 96. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 26 (1999). 
 97. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 
676, 676 (2007) (“A voting-rule version of Chevron would . . . allow more precise calibration of 
the level of judicial deference over time, and holding the level of deference constant, a voting 
rule would produce less variance in deference across courts and over time, yielding a lower level 
of legal uncertainty than does the doctrinal version of Chevron.”). 
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hard to defeat it, in part because it is foreign to our traditions. It 
might well be best to attempt to counteract politicized voting in a 
more conventional and less unprecedented way. 
Moreover, the data suggest another objection to this approach, at 
least if it is intended as a response to politicized voting in 
administrative law. The most serious problem comes on RRR and 
DDD panels; it is on such panels that the most politicized voting can 
be found. On RRD and RDD panels, the role of politics is limited 
and even hard to detect. The evidence suggests that a unanimity 
requirement would provide help where no help is required and would 
provide no help where help is greatly needed. It emerges that the 
Gersen/Vermeule proposal is a plausible if partial response to the risk 
of excessive invalidations, but it would not solve the problem of 
politicized administrative law. And for those who suspect politically 
motivated validations, a voting rule, of the sort that Professors 
Gersen and Vermeule recommend, would seem perverse. Unanimity 
might be required to uphold rather than invalidate agency action; but 
to say the least, that approach would present problems of its own. 
3. Mixed Panels.  Much of modern adjudication is undertaken by 
federal administrative agencies. Indeed, the National Labor Relations 
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal 
Communications Commission do much of their business via 
adjudication. By federal statute, these and other agencies must have 
mixed compositions, in the sense that no more than a bare majority of 
their members can come from a single political party.98 Recent 
evidence shows that the partisan affiliation of board members 
predicts their votes and suggests that mandated partisan composition 
matters within these agencies.99 Building on these precedents, we 
might be tempted to suggest that federal courts of appeals do better if 
they have mixed compositions—and that in certain cases, at least, 
mixed compositions might be mandated.100 
 
 98. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (requiring bipartisan composition of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission). 
 99. Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan 
Requirements on Regulation 35 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf (reviewing the empirical literature and finding that 
partisan affiliation of Federal Communications Commission commissioners correlates with 
voting patterns, even after controlling for the party of the appointing president). 
 100. See Tiller & Cross, supra note 16, at 215 (calling for mandating politically mixed panels 
rather than pure random assignment). 
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As a response to the problems found here, there is a great deal to 
be said on behalf of panels of mixed composition. If DDD and RRR 
panels are the most serious problem, then that problem would appear 
to be solved by ensuring against unified panels. But a requirement of 
mixed panels would create both administrative and symbolic 
problems, and there may be pragmatic objections as well. Assignment 
to three-judge panels is now random,101 and it would be quite 
complicated to take steps to ensure that all such panels, in 
administrative law cases, have both Democratic and Republican 
appointees. In addition, judges are supposed to leave their political 
commitments behind once they become judges, and a requirement of 
mixed panels might seem objectionable insofar as it would be an 
acknowledgement that political commitments matter to judging. That 
acknowledgement might entrench the very problem that it is intended 
to reduce. Perhaps both Republican and Democratic appointees 
would conceive of themselves, to a somewhat greater degree, as 
political partisans, simply because the requirement of mixed 
composition would suggest as much. 
The question, then, is whether the problem of politicized 
administrative law is sufficiently severe as to justify strong medicine 
of this kind. The answer may be affirmative, at least in cases in which 
the stakes are especially high. The issue is whether other, less 
aggressive responses can provide adequate safeguards. 
4. Rethinking Judicial Selection and Confirmation.  Perhaps the 
most straightforward response to politicized voting would be to alter 
the process of judicial selection and confirmation. The goal would be 
to produce smaller differences, or no differences, between 
Republican and Democratic appointees in the domain of 
administrative law. A president could certainly move in this direction 
on his own, perhaps by seeking to appoint judges whose voting 
patterns are less likely to be politicized, perhaps by appointing a mix 
of judges whose overall patterns would be less ideological. The 
Senate could act either on its own or with the president, aiming to 
ensure less partisan appointees or an ideological mix for any 
particular administration. 
An approach of this kind would have real advantages, especially 
insofar as it would move the emphasis, in judicial appointments, away 
from ideology and toward professionalism. But it too would run into 
 
 101. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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objections. Administrative law is not the most salient domain of the 
appointments process (however much administrative law specialists 
may lament that admittedly unfortunate fact!). The high-profile 
issues, typically involving constitutional law, will inevitably dominate 
the discussion. Any president is likely to want to appoint judges who 
fall, broadly speaking, into one kind of camp rather than another, and 
at least for the Supreme Court, a degree of politicization is inevitable. 
There is a further point. A president, and a Senate, might 
reasonably believe, on some occasions, that the judiciary has already 
been “skewed,” and that for new appointments, taking account of 
likely voting patterns is a way of redressing the balance. Having said 
that, we believe that it is entirely appropriate for administrations to 
seek a mix of appointees, rather than to steer the judiciary in a single 
direction. But a defense of this claim would take us well beyond our 
topic here.102 
CONCLUSION 
In the recent period, administrative law has been highly 
politicized in the sense that the voting patterns of Republican 
appointees are significantly different from the voting patterns of 
Democratic appointees. The politicized patterns are strikingly similar 
in Chevron cases and in arbitrariness cases. In both domains, federal 
judges show especially politicized voting patterns on unified panels, 
where the disparities between Republican and Democratic 
appointees are very large. On the Supreme Court itself, many of the 
Justices show an ideological “skew” in their application of the 
Chevron framework. 
It is reasonably clear that no one should be happy about this 
state of affairs. It is much less clear what should be done about it. 
Sunlight is often a disinfectant, and perhaps a broader knowledge of 
recent patterns will supply a kind of corrective; we have suggested 
that publicized “rankings” of judges, in terms of politicization, might 
provide some help. There is certainly reason for greater skepticism 
about courts of appeals decisions when unified panels reach a 
conclusion that fits with their expected predilections. Doctrinal 
changes, calling for heightened deference to agency action, would 
decrease the likelihood of politicized invalidations. It would not, 
 
 102. For a relevant discussion, see generally David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992). 
SUNSTEIN_IN_FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:55:48 AM 
2230 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2193 
however, decrease the likelihood of politicized validations, and that 
problem would be made worse by doctrinal changes producing 
greater deference. 
The largest lesson is that there is more reason to trust the 
outcomes of mixed panels than the outcomes of unified panels. 
Whether mixed panels should be required is not a question that the 
evidence can itself answer; but it is a question that the evidence 
makes it reasonable to ask. Our largest hope is that an understanding 
of politicized administrative law, and of possible responses, will bear 
on many domains in which federal judges are divided along 
predictable lines, and indeed other domains in which entrenched 
differences, and potential biases, create potential difficulties for both 
private and public institutions. 
 
